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- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
- being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
- The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
- prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
- See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
-
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
-
- Syllabus
-
- BATH IRON WORKS CORP. et al. v. DIRECTOR,
- OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
- PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
- LABOR, et al.
- certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
- the first circuit
- No. 91-871. Argued November 4, 1992-Decided January 12, 1993
-
- Upon learning after he retired that he suffered from a work-related
- hearing loss, respondent Brown, a former employee of petitioner Bath
- Iron Works Corp., filed a timely claim for disability benefits under
- the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. In calcu-
- lating Brown's benefits, the Administrative Law Judge applied a
- hybrid of the compensation systems set forth in 8(c)(13) and
- 8(c)(23) of that Act, and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. Reject-
- ing the Board's reliance on 8(c)(23), the Court of Appeals held that
- hearing loss claims, whether filed by current workers or retirees,
- must be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(13). Under that section, a
- claimant who has suffered a disabling injury of a kind specifically
- identified in a schedule, including hearing loss, is entitled to certain
- benefits regardless of whether his earning capacity had actually been
- impaired. In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
- Eleventh Circuits have held that a retiree's claim for occupational
- hearing loss should be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(23). Under
- that section, a retiree who suffers from an occupational disease that
- did not become disabling until after retirement-one ``which does not
- immediately result in death or disability'' in the words of the
- Act-receives certain benefits based on the ``time of injury,'' which is
- defined as the date on which the claimant becomes aware, or reason-
- ably should have been aware, of the relationship between the employ-
- ment, the disease, and the disability. In Brown's case, as in most
- cases, 8(c)(13) benefits would be more generous than 8(c)(23)
- benefits.
- Held:Claims for hearing loss, whether filed by current workers or
- retirees, are claims for a scheduled injury and must be compensated
- under 8(c)(13), not 8(c)(23). Respondent Director's undisputed
- characterization of occupational hearing loss as a condition that does
- cause immediate disability must be accepted. A worker who is
- exposed to excessive noise suffers the injury of such loss, which, as
- a scheduled injury, is presumptively disabling, simultaneously with
- that exposure. Thus, the loss cannot be compensated under 8(c)(23)
- as ``an occupational disease which does not immediately result in . . .
- disability.'' In holding that claims for occupational hearing loss
- should be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(23), the Eleventh and Fifth
- Circuits have essentially read this key phrase out of the statute. To
- the extent there is any unfairness in the statutory scheme in that
- employers may be held liable for postretirement increases in hearing
- loss due to aging, they can protect themselves by giving employees
- audiograms at the time of retirement and thereby freezing the
- amount of compensable hearing loss. A lone Senator's single passing
- remark in the legislative history does not persuade this Court that
- retirees' hearing loss claims should be compensated under 8(c)(23).
- Pp.10-14.
- 942 F.2d 811, affirmed.
-
- Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
-